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NOTES
The Constitutional Rights of College Students to Use
State-Owned University Buildings for Religious
Services
Evangelical Christianity1 is increasingly becoming a visible force
in American society. It has exerted its influence most recently in the
political arena through the lobbying of fundamentalist groups such
as the Moral Majority.2 However, Evangelical Christianity has also
made its mark on the college campus through officially recognized,
on-campus religious organizations.3
In recent years, university officials have questioned the constitu-
tionality of conducting religious services in state-owned university
buildings. Some universities have prohibited on-campus religious
services, through school regulations. In response, students have chal-
lenged these regulations in court-often with success.4 The campus
cases5 have turned on two issues: 1) Are the school regulations neces-
sary to prevent an unconstitutional establishment of religion? 2) Do
1 "Evangelical" means "of, relating to, or being a religious group emphasizing salvation
by faith in the atoning work of Jesus Christ through personal conversion, the authority of
Scripture, and the importance of preaching as contrasted with ritual." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 786 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Anderson, To The Right, March!, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1981, at 24-30; Mann
& Peterson, Preachers in Politics: Decisive Force in '80?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 15,
1980, at 24; Mann, As Religious Right Flexes its Mscles, U.S. NEws &.WORLD REP., Dec. 29,
1980/Jan. 5, 1981, at 69; Mayer, A Tide of Born-Again Politics, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1980, at
28. In 1978, evangelical activists helped unseat at least two liberal U.S. senators (Dick Clark,
Iowa, and Thomas McIntyre, New Hampshire), and helped elect one governor (Fob James,
Alabama). Additionally they successfully battled the Equal Rights Amendment in fifteen
states, "disrupted" a White House Conference on the Family, "impeded" the most recent
Congressional reform of the criminal code, and forced the Federal Communications Commis-
sion and the Internal Revenue Service to "back down" on challenges to religious organiza-
tions. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1980, at 29.
3 Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship, Campus Crusade for Christ, and Cornerstone are
among the many religious organizations that meet regularly on college campuses.
4 Dittman v. Western Wash. Univ., No. 79-1189 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (holding for univer-
sity), appeal docketed, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1980); Chess v. Widmar (Chess 1), 480 F.
Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding for students), cert.
grantedsub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1981); University of Del. v. Keegan
(Keegan 1), 318 A.2d 135 (Del. Ch. 1974), reod, 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975) (holding for students),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
5 As used in this note, the term "campus cases" means the lower court decisions cited in
note 4 srupra.
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the school regulations violate the students' constitutional right to the
free exercise of their religion?
6
The Supreme Court of the United States has not addressed the
specific issues raised in the campus cases. 7 Without Supreme Court
precedent, courts deciding the campus cases have often used a consti-
tutional balancing test which weighs the students' interest in free ex-
ercise of religion against the university's interest in avoiding the
establishment of religion. 8 This note analyzes whether that balanc-
ing test is appropriate even though both opposing interests have a
constitutional basis. Part I reviews the campus cases; Part II analyzes
the weaknesses of the balancing test applied in the campus cases; and
Part III proposes a new model for determining whether a university
has properly regulated religious services in state-owned university
buildings.
I. The Campus Cases
Three jurisdictions have analyzed the right of students to use
state-owned university buildings for religious services. The earliest
decision, Universiy of Delaware v. Keegan,9 involved a lawsuit by the
university to enjoin a group of Roman Catholic students and their
priests from celebrating mass in a campus building. The university
had prohibited religious services in campus buildings in 1971.10 In
6 See note 4supra. Cf. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (denying
high school students access to classrooms for voluntary communal prayer meetings).
7 School Dist. of Abington Township, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (compulsory Bible reading in
public school), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (compulsory prayer in public school),
involved different issues. The challenged statutes in those cases mandated prayer or Bible
reading in the schools. The religious activities involved in the campus cases, however, are
wholly voluntary. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), has been cited for the proposi-
tion that state-owned property may not be used for religious services. See, e.g., Chess v.
Widmar, 480 F. Supp. at 913-16. In Tilton, the Court upheld federal construction grants for
private universities but invalidated that portion of the legislation that allowed religious use of
the facilities after twenty years. The Court did not want a sectarian college to have exclusive
control of a government-financed building. The campus cases, however, involve a temporary
religious use of buildings which remain under the public university's control. Chess v.
Widmar, 635 F.2d at 1319.
8 The court in Chess I stated the test slightly differently. The court weighed the stu-
dents' free exercise interest against the state's interest in maintaining the separation of church
and state. 480 F. Supp. at 917. The Second Circuit used this statement of the test in the high
school context in Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the court
balanced students' free exercise rights against the school's concern for nonestablishment, de-
nying students access to classrooms for voluntary communal prayer meetings.
9 318 A.2d 135 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd, 349 A.2d 14 (Del. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934
(1976).
10 A university directive issued October 1, 1971, "University-Campus Ministry Position
Paper," stated: "Recognized [religious] groups may upon proper registration use space in the
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1973, at the request of certain students, Fr. William F. Keegan began
celebrating masses in the common room of a university dormitory
without obtaining university authorization. After several unsuccess-
ful attempts to halt these masses, the university sought to enjoin
them."' The defendants counter-claimed, seeking an injunction
against any interference with their religious services. The chancery
court held for the students, temporarily enjoining the university from
further interference.' 2 At a later hearing for a permanent injunction,
the chancery court dissolved its prior order and enjoined the students
from continuing the religious services.13 The court reasoned that al-
though use of the common room for nondiscriminatory religious serv-
ices did not establish religion, the students had failed to demonstrate
a substantial infringement on their free exercise rights.
14
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held for the stu-
dents and remanded the case to the chancery court.' 5 The state
supreme court agreed with the chancery court that allowing equal
access to university buildings for student religious services did not
necessarily establish religion.' 6 The court stated that a permissive
policy regarding the use of university buildings for religious services
would: 1) fulfill the secular purpose of allowing students an opportu-
nity to discuss ideas, 2) result in neither advancing nor inhibiting
religion, and 3) avoid excessive entanglement of government and reli-
gion. 17 The court stated further that any benefit to religion was
purely incidental, thus reflecting a neutral accomodation of religion.
Next, the court determined that the students' free exercise rights were
burdened by the university's religious services ban. The court found
that directly limiting the students' right to worship on campus vio-
lated the constitution.' 8 The court remanded the case, however, to
resolve whether the burden on the students was justified by a compel-
Student Center and other buildings for business meetings and social programs but not for
worship services." Id. at 136.
11 Id. at 137.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 142.
14 Id. at 140-42.
15 349 A.2d at 19.
16 Id. at 16.
17 Id. The court applied the three-part test laid out by the United States Supreme Court
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971): "First, the statute must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. . . .; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
18 349 A.2d at 17-19.
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ling state interest. ' 9
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri faced a fact situation similar to Keegan's in Chess v.
Widmar.20 In Chess, eleven University of Missouri-Kansas City stu-
dents, members of a recognized student religious organization, chal-
lenged university regulations prohibiting religious services in the
student union.21 The court, finding for the university, rejected the
Keegan reasoning and held that the religious services ban was re-
quired by the establishment clause.22 In addressing the students' free
exercise argument, the court stated that the university regulations
did not infringe upon a "deep religious conviction" of the students.
23
The court stated further that even if there was such a burden the
state's interest in maintaining the separation of church and state
should be balanced against the students' claims to the free exercise of
religion. The court found that the university's interest "overbal-
anced" the students' interest. 24 The court then rejected the students'
argument that when free exercise rights and establishment concerns
directly conflict, the free exercise rights should prevail. 25 The court
said that the clauses should be read together, with neither clause be-
ing subordinate to the other.26 Finally, the court rejected the stu-
dents' arguments that the regulations were a prior restraint on
religious speech 27 that the regulations denied the plaintiffs equal
protection of the law,28 and that the regulations were vague.29
19 Id. at 19. The state had not attempted to show during the trial a compelling state
interest because the trial court had not addressed that issue. There have been no further
reported probeedings following the remand.
20 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. grantedsub
nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1981).
21 The regulations provided in part:
No university buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein provided) may be
used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by either student or non-
student groups. Student congregations of local churches or of recognized denomi-
nations or sects, although not technically recognized campus groups, may use the
facilities, commonly referred to as the student union or center or commons under
the same regulations that apply to recognized campus organizations, provided that
no University facilities may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching.
480 F. Supp. at 909.
22 Id. at 916. The court found that Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1972), required
the worship ban. See note 7 supra.
23 480 F. Supp. at 917.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 917-18.
27 Id. at 918.
28 Id. at 919.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed the Chess district court in August 1980.30 After acknowledging
the students' constitutional rights of freedom of religious expression
and equal access to a public forum, the court held that an equal
access policy would not establish religion 3t and that the university
regulations inhibited religion in contravention of the establishment
clause.3 2 Relying on O'Hair v. Andrus, 3 the court found that allowing
the use of buildings was a neutral accomodation of religion.3 4 The
court invalidated the university regulations because they burdened
the students' free exercise rights, and because the neutral accomoda-
tion resulting from the regulations' invalidation would not constitute
an establishment of religion.
35
Dittman v. Western Washington University36 was the third campus
case to be tried. In Dittman, students challenged a university regula-
tion restricting, but not prohibiting, the use of campus buildings by
student groups for religious services 7 Relying on the Washington
state constitution and the district court's opinion in Chess, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington held
that an equal access policy would violate the establishment clause.3 8
In evaluating the students' free exercise claims, the court weighed the
state's interest in avoiding the establishment of religion against the
minimal restraints on the students' rights, and found that the state's
interest should be protected.
39
29 Id. at 919-20.
30 635 F.2d 1310. This is the most recent opinion on the use of campus buildings for
religious services.
31 Id. at 1317.
32 Id. at 1320.
33 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting a challenge to the scheduled use of the Na-
tional Mall for the celebration of Mass by Pope John Paul II).
34 635 F.2d at 1317.
35 Id. at 1320.
36 No. 79-1189 (W.D. Wash. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1980).
37 The regulation stated:
The policy to which plaintiff's object restricts the use of university classrooms
and auditoriums for religious worship, exercise, or instruction to two times per aca-
demic quarter. It requires further that fair rental value be paid for each such use.
Students and student groups of the University are allowed to use the facilities of the
University for non-religious activities on a 'first-come, first-served' basis with no
restrictions upon the number of times that the facilities are used for those purposes.
No fee is charged for the use of University facilities for non-religious purposes.
Id., slip op. at I.
38 Id. at 5.
39 Id. at 5-6.
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II. The Religion Clause Analysis
When courts use the religion clauses to analyze the validity of
student use of university buildings for religious services, they focus on
either the establishment clause or the free exercise clause. Most of
the courts have tended to examine the campus cases primarily from
the establishment of religion standpoint. By considering first
whether the students' activities established religion, the courts appear
to have reached their ultimate conclusions before analyzing the stu-
dents' allegations of free exercise violations. In Keegan T,40 Chess f,41
and Ditman,42 the courts discussed the establishment clause concerns
extensively before addressing the violation of free exercise rights,
which was the gravaman of the students' complaints. Instead, the
courts should have focused on the students' free exercise rights and
burdens, and discussed the establishment questions only as they re-
lated to the free exercise claims.
43
A. Free Exercise is the Key Issue
The campus cases center on challenges of university regulations
in which the challengers have the initial burden of establishing an
unconstitutional infringement on their rights.44  The regulation's
proponents must then counter with a sufficient justification for the
regulation.45 The logical starting point, therefore, is to analyze the
regulation and to determine the extent to which it unconstitutionally
burdens the challengers.
The university regulations disputed in the campus cases stated
that: "No worship services are allowed in campus buildings. '46 On
40 318 A.2d at 138-40.
41 480 F. Supp. at 914-17.
42 Slip op. at 3-6.
43 The court in Keegan II recognized the significance of phrasing the issue from the uni-
versity's viewpoint (no establishment) or from the individual student's viewpoint (free exer-
cise). The court viewed the issue as one of religious liberty and selected the students'
formulation of the issue. 349 A.2d at 17. Professor Kurland has also noted the significance of
labeling a case either "free exercise" or "nonestablishment." He claims that the exemption
granted on free exercise grounds in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish children
exempted from state public education law), would fail the three-part nonestablishment test of
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 17 (1978).
44 See, e.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946) (rejecting due process
challenge to New York Multiple Dwelling Law); Detroit Int'l Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax
Appeal Bd., 287 U.S. 295 (1932) (rejecting commerce clause challenge to state franchise tax).
45 See, e.g., Louis K. Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (upholding state license taxes
against equal protection and commerce clause attacks).
46 But see note 37 supra. The regulation in the Ditman case restricts, but does not pro-
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their face, the regulations directly burden the practice of religion on
campus by prohibiting crucial religious conduct, the communal wor-
ship of God. The university regulations imposed a more direct bur-
den on religion than that created by the statutes declared
unconstitutional in Sherbert v. Vemner 47 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 48 two
major free exercise cases. The statute in Sherbert stated that in order
to be eligible to collect unemployment compensation, all members of
the work force, including the petitioner, a Seventh-Day Adventist,
had to be willing to accept "suitable work," including work on Satur-
days.49 The Court held that since the petitioner's religion forbade
her from working on Saturday, the unemployment compensation
statute as applied to her indirectly violated her right to exercise her
religion.50 In Yoder, an Amish man challenged his state's compulsory
education statute,51 claiming that it indirectly burdened his right to
free exercise by requiring him to send his children to school for more
years than his religion allowed. Despite the statute's legitimate goals,
the Court held that it violated Yoder's right to practice his religion.
52
In the campus cases, by contrast, the university regulations are aimed
directly at the religious conduct. Since the regulation's unconstitu-
tional burden is not merely incidental to the pursuit of some other
governmental interest, the campus cases present much stronger facts
for a free exercise violation.
The students' goal in conducting religious services adds support
to the contention that their suit should be viewed primarily as a free
exercise case and not as an establishment case. The students are not
requesting "special" treatment on account of their religion; certainly
hibit, on-campus group worship. Such a regulation still burdens the students' free exercise
rights, as that court noted. Slip op. at 6.
47 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
48 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
49 To be eligible for benefits a claimant must be "able to work" and "available for work"
and a claimant is ineligible for benefits "[i]f. . . he has failed, without good cause. . . to
accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer
.... " S.C. CODE §§ 68-1 to -404 (1952).
50 374 U.S. at 403-06.
51 The statute provided:
'- Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school, any person
having under his control a child who is between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall
cause such child to attend school regularly during the full period and hours, reli-
gious holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which such child
should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school term, quarter or semester
of the school year in which he becomes 16 years of age.
Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969).
52 406 U.S. at 218.
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that would raise establishment questions. 53 Instead, the students re-
quest only that they be given the same access to campus buildings
enjoyed -by other student groups. In this respect, their complaint
raises less establishment issues than did the complaints in Sherbert and
Yoder. In the latter two cases, the individuals asked to be exempted
from the duties imposed generally by the statute because of their reli-
gion. In granting religious exemptions in those cases, the Court con-
ferred benefits based solely on religion-a clear establishment of
religion. In the campus cases, however, the students' free exercise
claim presents less of an establishment problem. If the students are
allowed to have religious services on campus, they receive nothing
more than access to campus facilities equal to that which other stu-
dent groups receive.
54
When viewed as requests not to be excluded because of religion,
the campus cases are quite similar to McDaniel v. Pay, 5 a Supreme
Court free exercise decision. The petitioner, an ordained minister,
challenged a Tennessee statute forbidding clergy from being dele-
gates to the state constitutional convention.5 6 The essence of the pe-
titioner's claim was that he should be treated equally and not be
burdened solely because he practiced his religion as a clergyman. A
plurality of the Court 57 agreed that Tennessee's discriminatory treat-
ment based on religious practice violated the free exercise clause.
58
The implication of McDaniel, that a person cannot be selected for
53 When religious groups have sought "special" treatment under the law, their requests
have been denied under the establishment clause. In McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948), the Court found unconstitutional a program in which clergy came into public
schools to teach religion to interested students. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),
the Court found unconstitutional state statutes providing salary supplements to non-public
school teachers, the great majority of whom taught at Catholic schools.
54 This statement implies that the university should not distinguish students' access rights
based on the content of students' activities. See text accompanying notes 102 to 114 infra.
55 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
56 In its first Constitution, in 1796, Tennessee disqualified ministers from serving as
legislators. That disqualifying provision has continued unchanged since its adop-
tion; it is now Art. 9, § I of the State Constitution. The state legislature applied
this provision to candidates for delegate to the State's 1977 limited constitutional
convention when it enacted ch. 848, § 4, of 1976 Tenn. Publ. Acts: "Any citizen of
the state who can qualify for membership in the House of Representatives of the
General Assembly may become a candidate for delegate to the convention."
435 U.S. at 621.
57 Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion in which Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
Stevens joined. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in judgment, in which Justice
Marshall joined. Justices Stewart and White filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Jus-
tice Blackmun did not participate in the decision.
58 435 U.S. at 629.
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unfavorable treatment based on his religious practices, is also the
core of the students' complaints in the campus cases.
B. Failure of the Free Exercise Balancing Test
When the courts hearing the campus cases reached the students'
free exercise claims, they often proceeded to a constitutional balanc-
ing test. After the court determined that the students had a constitu-
tional right to the free exercise of their religion and that the
university's regulations burdened that right, the court inquired
whether the state university had a compelling interest justifying that
burden.5 9 The courts balanced free exercise against nonestablish-
ment in Chess 160 and Dittman,61 and in those cases, the courts held
that the state's interest in avoiding an establishment of religion out-
weighed the students' interest in the free exercise of religion.62
Although the balancing test is appropriate in many free exercise
cases, it is not viable in cases such as the campus cases, in which the
final balancing is between the coordinate constitutional guarantees
of free exercise and nonestablishment, neither of which can be
subordinated to the other.63 A review of the more appropriate uses of
the balancing test indicates that the test does not satisfactorily resolve
the issues when the asserted state interest is in the nonestablishment
of religion.
The Court has balanced state's interests against individuals' in-
terests since the turn of the century. InJacobson v. Massachusetts,64 the
Court found that the state's interest in public health and safety was
sufficient to overcome a claim of religious liberty, and it upheld a
compulsory vaccination statute. Later state cases65 have citedJacob-
son for the constitutionality of health and safety measures. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut,66 the Court stated that the state's concern for
public peace and order would justify restraints on religiously-moti-
59 See Keegan II, 349 A.2d at 16, for the clearest statement of the test.
60 480 F. Supp. at 917. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
61 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
62 Accord, Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (application of the
balancing test showed that the state's interest in nonestablishment of religion outweighed the
students' free exercise rights in having a voluntary group prayer meeting at a public high
school).
63 See text accompanying notes 95 to 100 infra.
64 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (decided before the religion clauses were applied to the states).
65 E.g., Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964) (compulsory vaccination of
school children); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409 (1947) (snake handling
by religious group not permitted).
66 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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vated breaches of the peace. Similarly, in Reynolds v. United States,67
the Court held that the state's interest in enforcing public morality
took priority over the religiously-motivated practice of polygamy.
More recently, injohnson v. Robison, 68 the Court rejected a conscien-
tious objector's challenge of a statute denying veteran benefits to ci-
vilian conscientious objectors, while granting them to active veterans.
The Court held that the state's interest in enhancing military service
and aiding the active-duty veterans' readjustment to civilian life
through veterans' educational benefits justified the burden on the
conscientious objector's free exercise rights.
69
A variety of state interests have been weighed against religious
liberty, and in these cases the Court has subordinated the individual
interests to those of the state. Not until the 1963 case of Sherbert v.
Verner,70 and later with Wisconsin v. Yoder7' in 1972, did the individ-
ual's free exercise right receive the recognition it now receives.
In Sherbert, the Court used the balancing test in evaluating Ms.
Sherbert's free exercise claim. The Court found that the denial of
benefits burdened Ms. Sherbert's constitutional religious liberty.
The Court also found that Ms. Sherbert's religious rights were signifi-
cantly burdened because the statute forced her to choose between her
religious beliefs and government benefits. 72 The Court stated that "if
the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law
is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be character-
ized as being only indirect.
'73
Finally the Court weighed the state's interest in not granting a
religious exemption against Ms. Sherbert's constitutional right. 74
From the outset, the state's interest had to meet a stringent test: "It
is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice [to justify a substantial infringe-
67 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
68 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
69 Ild. at 385.
70 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The departure from a free exercise-free speech standard first
occurred with Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), in which the Court invalidated a
state constitutional provision requiring a declaration of belief in God as a requirement for
'taking public office. This discussion begins with Sherbert, however, because it was the first to
use the balancing test.
71 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
72 374 U.S. at 406.
73 Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
74 The Court appropriately distinguished the state's interest in not granting an exemp-
tion to the statute from the state's interest in passing the statute in the first place. Only the
interest in not granting the exemption is relevant in the balancing test used here.
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ment of religious liberty]; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give oc-
casion for permissible limitation.' ,,75 At trial, the state had intro-
duced no evidence of any "strong countervailing interest. '76
Nevertheless, on appeal, the Court dismissed the goal of preventing
fraudulent claims based on feigned objections to Saturday work as a
possible state interest. The resulting administrative efficiency, the
Court reasoned, was not substantial enough to justify the burden on
free exercise."
In Yod r,78 the Court balanced a more compelling governmental
interest against free exercise. An Amish parent, who believed a high
school education conflicted with the Amish religion and lifestyle,
wanted his children exempted on religious grounds from formal edu-
cation to age sixteen. The Court once again applied the balancing
test in its free exercise analysis:
[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond
the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes
with the practice of a legitimate belief, it must appear that the
State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its request
or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override
the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.7 9
The state argued that compulsory education developed intelligent
and self-sufficient members of society. However, the Court held that
this state interest was not sufficiently compelling when weighed
against the resulting interference with religious freedom. The Court
required a "more particularized showing" to justify such
interference.8 0
The language from Sherbert and Yoder illustrates how the Court
balances the burden on free exercise of religion against any compel-
ling state interest. As shown by these cases, the modem trend has
been to use this test to find that the individual interest in religious
exercise is greater than the asserted state interest.
The problems inherent in applying the balancing test to the
campus cases also become more apparent when that test's results are
compared with those of its theoretical predecessor, the equal protec-
75 374 U.S. at 406 (citation omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945)).
76 Id. at 407.
77 Id.
78 406 U.S 205 (1972).
79 Id. at 214.
80 Id. at 227.
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tion strict scrutiny test. The equal protection doctrine was developed
in cases challenging legislative classifications. 8 t In most statutory
classification cases, the Court determines whether the group subject
to the statute is a rationally selected group in light of the statute's
purposes. 2 However, in cases involving a statute which singles out
classes that have been historically subject to unfair treatment or
where the statute infringes upon "fundamental interests," the Court
has applied the more rigid strict scrutiny test.8 3 The Court has re-
quired the states to show a "compelling state interest" to justify any
statute subject to the strict scrutiny test.
The strict scrutiny test presumes a statute's unconstitutional-
ity.8 4 Few statutes survive the test because few state interests are
great enough to outweigh the significant individual constitutional
rights at stake.8 5 Chief Justice Warren Burger has noted the formi-
dable barrier imposed by the strict scrutiny test: "So far as I am
aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable
standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than
perfection.18 6 While the Chief Justice's statement has not proven
completely accurate,8 7 the test operates more as a conclusion than as
a test of constitutionality. The issue in the strict scrutiny equal pro-
tection cases is whether a fundamental interest is involved. If such
interest is involved, the state invariably loses.
In the campus cases, application of the balancing test resulted in
the state invariably winning,88 a result opposite to that which the
equal protection strict scrutiny analysis would indicate.8 9 Also, the
presumption of unconstitutionality present in the equal protection
cases is not found in the campus cases.90
81 See Tussman & tenBroek, The EqualProtection ofthe Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
82 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1000-02 (1978).
83 Justice Stone first stated the strict scrutiny test in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
84 Eg., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking statute denying aliens wel-
fare benefits); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking race miscegenation statute).
85 There are few cases which have strictly scrutinized and upheld statutes impairing fun-
damental rights. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding federal ceiling on
contributions to politics); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding
state's judgment that 50-day durational voter requirement was necessary to promote state's
interest in accurate voter lists).
86 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (standard applied to durational resi-
dence requirements for voting).
87 See note 85 supra.
88 See the lower court opinions in note 4 supra.
89 See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
90 See text accompanying note 84 supra.
[October 19811
[Vol. 57:91]
The explanation for this anomaly lies in the unique character of
the state's interest asserted in the campus cases. In those cases, the
state asserted a countervailing constitutional interest in avoiding an
establishment of religion. In certain similar cases,9 1 states had
claimed interests in the public welfare or in efficient administration,
but the state's interest had not previously risen to a constitutional
stature.92 The campus cases thus presented a face-to-face confronta-
tion between two apparently coordinate constitutional rights: free
exercise and nonestablishment.
In weighing these two interests against one another, either they
must be treated as coordinate interests, or one must be treated as
subordinate to the other. Unfortunately, neither of these alternatives
is acceptable. Under the first, the conflict between the students'
rights and the university's rights remains unresolved. Although the
second alternative may have greater appeal, it too presents a specious
solution. Some commentators have argued for the second alternative
by interpreting Supreme Court decisions to hold that nonestablish-
ment is subordinate to free exercise.93 The Court, however, has not
explicitly ruled on the point.94 Language in Wisconsin V. Yoder comes
close to suggesting this order of priority,95 but Yoder did not involve a
direct confrontation between the two religion clauses. The asserted
state interest was the furthering of public education, a nonconstitu-
tional and secular state interest.9 6
McDaniel v. Paty 97 addresses the issue of priority more directly.
In McDaniel, a clergyman challenged a Tennessee statute forbidding
the election of "Ministers of the Gospel" as delegates to the state's
constitutional convention. Although Tennessee asserted some inter-
est in preventing the establishment of religion, a plurality of the
91 See text accompanying notes 81 to 83 supra.
92 In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), the state's interest nearly reached constitu-
tional stature, but the state never succeeded in demonstrating the establishment clause dan-
gers of clergy participation in the political process. Id. at 628.
93 See, e.g., Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part One:
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381 (1967); Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free
"Axercire, 61 GEO. LJ. 1115 (1973).
94 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the Chess case, 49 U.S.LW. 3596 (1981).
One issue the Court may consider is whether free exercise takes precedence over the establish-
ment clause. Id.
95 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In dissent Justice Douglas wrote: "What we do today. . . opens
the way to give organized religion a broader base than it has ever enjoyed." 406 U.S. at 247
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part). He refused to concur in what he viewed as the elevation of
free exercise above other first amendment freedoms.
96 Id. at 221-25.
97 See note 92 supra.
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Court refused to use this interest in any balancing test: "[t]here is no
occasion to inquire whether promoting such an interest is a permissi-
ble legislative goal. . for Tennessee has failed to demonstrate that
its views of the dangers of clergy participation in the political process
have not lost whatever validity they may once have enjoyed."9
Thus, the Court refused this opportunity to clarify the relationship
between free exercise and nonestablishment. Courts should read the
silence of the Court as a reluctance to subordinate one clause to the
other and should similarly refrain from subordinating one clause to
the other.
III. The Broader Analysis of Constitutional Rights
Concluding that no balancing can occur between the two reli-
gion clauses does not settle the dispute in the campus cases. The in-
ability to reconcile this dispute stems from too narrow an
understanding of the issues. The campus cases are more than reli-
gion clause cases. Unlike more common free exercise cases, the cam-
pus cases also involve constitutional rights other than free exercise
that should be considered in any test of constitutional validity.
While the religion clause analysis focuses on the religious con-
tent of the student's speech, the campus cases can be analyzed more
clearly in terms of the students' acts of speech and association, irre-
spective of any religious content.99 Although religion cases are not
commonly analyzed in terms of free speech and the freedom to asso-
ciate, it may be necessary to do so in cases such as the campus cases,
where a religion clause analysis culminates in a dead lock between
the two religion clauses.
A. Freedom of Speech
1. Nature of the Right
The first amendment prohibits the government from passing
any law abridging the freedom of speech. 10° The government can
violate this prohibition in two distinct ways.'01 First, the government
98 435 U.S. at 628.
99 This type of analysis was prevalent during the 1940s and 1950s, when the Court struck
statutes limiting religious expression on free speech grounds. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing convictions of several Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting
funds without a license because they were engaged in the distribution of religious materials);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (invalidating discretionary public meeting licensing).
100 "Congress shall make no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.... " U.S. Const. amend. I.
101 See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 580-82 (1978).
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may affect the speech's content directly by penalizing a speaker be-
cause of what he has said. This form of abridgment occurs must
commonly in cases where a speaker has criticized the government.1
02
Second, the government may indirectly abridge the right to speak
freely while regulating some other function. An ordinance restricting
the distribution of leaflets in order to prevent litter is an example of
the second abridgement form. 0 3 While it is appropriate for the gov-
ernment to control litter, it must avoid any undue burdens on speech
caused by such regulation.
Distinguishing regulations aimed at content from those aimed at
other governmental ends has constitutional significance in evaluating
the regulations. If a regulation's prohibition is unrelated to the com-
munication's content, then reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions may be constitutional. 10 4 These restrictions are weighed
against the burden on free speech in a balancing process.' 0 5 The con-
tent of the speech being restricted is never evaluated in the balancing
process.' 0 6 Thus, when the free expression burden resulting from a
ban on noisy demonstrations near a school during school hours was
weighed against the legitimate state interest in having students
taught in relative quiet, the demonstrators' message was never
examined. 107
If a regulation is aimed at a communication's content, however,
the regulation is presumed unconstitutional. This principle was es-
tablished in Police Department of Chicago v. Moslqy,'08 where the Court
said that "government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content ... .0 Any
regulation of speech content is unconstitutional except when the
speech is directed to "inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action,"" 10 when the expression
is a defamatory falsehood,"'I or when the message is obscene."12 Un-
102 Ste, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (state cannot bar individ-
uals from employment in schools merely because the individual is a member of a "subversive"
organization).
103 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
104 Poutos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 398 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,
293-94 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
105 See general/y L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 682-83 (1978).
106 Exceptions to this rule are discussed in text accompanying notes 110-12.
107 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding ordinance).
108 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
109 Id. at 95.
110 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
111 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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less the regulated speech falls into one of these three categories, the
government has unconstitutionally abridged free speech by regulat-
ing its content. No balancing of interests is necessary, since the gov-
ernment can have no legitimate justification for abridging speech
content.
2. The Doctrine of Prior Restraint
When the campus cases are viewed as free speech cases, the uni-
versity regulations are unconstitutionally aimed at the content of re-
ligiously worshipful communications.1 3 The regulations function as
prior restraints on speech by prohibiting all worshipful communica-
tion from ever occurring.
Certain litigants' l4 and commentators 115 have focused on the
prior restraint of speech inherent in the university regulations in ar-
guing that the regulations should be invalidated. This argument
misconstrues the proper use of the prior restraint doctrine. When a
party complains of a prior restraint, the issue is one of form, not of
substance. 16 The prior restraint objection challenges the manner of
the restraint, but does not address the propriety of the restrained
speech. When a prior restraint is invalidated, the court nullifies the
procedure used to restrain speech; it does not foreclose the possibility
that some other means of restraint might be constitutional. 1' 7 The
prior restraint doctrine reflects a preference for punishing those who
abuse the right of speech after they break the law, rather than re-
straining their speech in anticipation of such a violation. 1 8
The prior restraint doctrine is applied when the restrained
112 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
113 The regulations do not prohibit communication about religious topics; however, they
do forbid religious communications in the context of worship. Thus the regulation unconsti-
tutionally singles out the worshipful content of the religious communication.
114 Dittman v. Western Wash. Univ., No. 79-1189, slip op. at 8 (W.D. Wash. filed Feb. 27,
1980),appealdocketed, No. 80-3120 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1980); Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907,
918 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. Widmar v.
Vincent, 101 S. Ct. 1345 (1981).
115 Rice, Conscientious Objection to Public Education: The Grievance and the Remedies, 1978 BRIG.
YOUNG L. REv. 847; Toms & Whitehead, The Religious Student in Public Education: Resolving a
Constitutional Dilemma, 27 EMORY L.J. 3, 31-34 (1978).
116 Emerson, The Doctrine ofPrior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
117 Murphy, The Prior Restraint Doctrine in the Supreme Court.- A Reevaluation, 51 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 898, 900 (1976).
118 "[A] free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break
the law rather than to throttle them and all others beforehand." Southeastern Promoters,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
[October 1981]
[Vol. 57:91]
speech is, at least arguably, within the protection of the first amend-
ment. "19 The prior restraint doctrine is most useful when it is uncer-
tain whether the restrained speech is protected. When clearly
protected speech is restrained, the prior restraint doctrine is unneces-
sary; the better strategy in such a case is to attack directly the uncon-
stitutional infringement. 120 Since the restraint on the students in the
campus cases clearly burdens protected speech, the doctrine of prior
restraint is unnecessary. The students' most promising line of attack
is to assert their right to express themselves free from religious con-
tent regulations.
3. The Public Forum Doctrine
It is ironic that the thrust of the campus cases is the regulation of
student worship in the college campus, the place traditionally de-
scribed as a "marketplace of ideas."' 21 The college campus is a place
for thought, a forum for the free exchange of ideas. The student
union building, in particular, is a public forum, open to all student
groups.' 22 Although sketched in earlier cases, 23 the Supreme Court
expressed the public forum doctrine most concisely in Police Depart-
ment v. Mose-y.124 In invalidating an ordinance that distinguished ex-
pressive activity based on content, the Court wrote:
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to
mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the
use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny
use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or
debating in public facilities. There is an "equality of status in the
field of ideas," and government must afford all points of view an
equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to as-
sembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit
others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend
to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based
on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content
alone.125
119 Murphy, sutpra note 117, at 900.
120 Id.
121 Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1318-19 (8th Cir. 1980); Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 180 (1972).
122 Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d at 1318.
123 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951);
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953). See also Kalven, The Concept ofthe Public Forum
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Or. REv. 1, 29-30.
124 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
125 Id. at 96 (citation omitted).
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Just as the public streets and sidewalks have historically been treated
as a forum for the exchange of ideas by all, so too, public university
campuses have gained a similar reputation as a forum for free expres-
sion. 126 Thus expression on the campus should be afforded the same
protection as expression on public streets.
B. Freedom of Association
1. Nature of the Right
In addition to their express constitutional right to freedom of
speech, students also have a constitutional right to freedom of associ-
ation implicit in the first amendment. 127 One commentator has de-
scribed the freedom of association right as shorthand for the rights of
free speech and petition as exercised by individuals in groups.
128
Political expression and the right of assembly are at the center of the
freedom of association right. 129 In the first case to present the doc-
trine clearly, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson I3o a political action
group was found to have the right of freedom of association. The
Court cited the freedom of association to bar state officials from ob-
taining a list of NAACP members in an investigation of communist
influence. The Court stated:
It is beyond dispute that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of "lib-
erty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, reh'gious or cultural matters .... 13'
The Court recognized that a compelled disclosure of an individual's
affiliation with a group abridged that individual's freedom of
association. 
3 2
Although the freedom of association right developed in the con-
text of political speech, it has been more broadly applied.133 The key
126 See text accompanying notes 123-124 supra.
127 See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 701-03 (1978).
128 Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1
(1977).
129 The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "Congress
shall make no law. . . abridging. . . the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
130 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
131 Id. at 460-61 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
132 Id. at 462.
133 See Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and The Right of Association, 30 HAS-
TINGS LJ. 1029 (1979).
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concept remains, however, that of expressing ideas-of whatever
sort-through a group. In Griswold v. Connecticut,13 4 Justice Douglas
wrote:
The right of "association," like the right of belief, is more than the
right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's atti-
tudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation
with it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is a
form of expression of opinion .... 135
The kinds of philosophies protected, Justice Douglas wrote, include
"forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary sense
but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the
members." 3 6
2. Applied to Student College Groups
Freedom of association has been a determinative right in a
number of cases involving student groups on university campuses. In
Healy v. James, 37 the Supreme Court overturned a university's ban
on the formation of a campus chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society. Nonrecognition of the group had prevented them from us-
ing campus facilities for their meetings. The lack of meeting facili-
ties, coupled with the lack of access to the school newspaper and
bulletin boards, burdened their freedom of association rights.
1 38
The university president had denied recognition to the SDS
chapter because he feared a close philosophical alliance with the na-
tional SDS organization.13 9 He sought to abridge freedom of associa-
tion rights because of the content of the SDS's ideas. The Court
rejected the university's argument, noting that no evidence of "immi-
nent lawless acts" had been presented.14° Healy stands for the propo-
sition that no abridgement of freedom of association rights will be
tolerated if the only competing state interest is the state's opposition
to the content of the speech.
Two federal appellate courts have recognized freedom of associ-
ation rights on.university campuses for members of homosexual orga-
134 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting the sale of
birth control devices).
135 Id. at 483.
136 Id.
137 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
138 Id. at 181.
139 Id. at 174 n.4.
140 Id. at 188-89.
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nizations. Gay Students Organization v. Bonner 14 1 involved a university's
refusal to let the Gay Students Organization have social functions on
campus. The First Circuit recognized the importance of social events
in promoting discussion and held the university had substantially
abridged the students' associational rights. 142 In Cay Lib v. University
of Missouri,143 the Eighth Circuit reversed a decision upholding the
university's denial of a meeting place for a homosexual discussion
group; the decision was predicated on the group's freedom of associa-
tion right.144
3. Freedom of Association for Worshiping on Campus
Recent case law thus supports a finding that college students
have a constitutional right to freedom of association. A university
can violate this associational right through a ban on on-campus wor-
ship. A chief purpose of the religious services is to allow students to
share their religious beliefs and ideas. 145 The university regulations
seek to stop this central activity. 146 By interfering with the group's
central activity, the university significantly frustrates the group's pur-
poses and infringes upon its members' freedom of association rights.
IV. Conclusion: A New Model for the Balancing Test
The balancing test cannot resolve the tension between free exer-
cise and non-establishment in the campus cases; it requires modifica-
tion. The courts should view the issues presented in the campus cases
from a broader perspective by considering all of the students' rele-
vant constitutional rights. Those rights include freedom of speech
and freedom of association, in addition to the freedom of religious
exercise.
The university's interest in prohibiting on-campus worship is
based on the possible establishment of religion which may result.
141 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
142 Id. at 659-60.
143 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
144 558 F.2d 848, 853-56.
145 One group, Cornerstone, listed its activities as:
1. The offering of prayer; 2. The singing of hymns in praise and thanksgiving;
3. The public reading of scripture; 4. The sharing of personal views and experiencs
(in relation to God) by various persons; 5. An exposition of, and commentary on,
passages of the Bible by one or more persons for the purpose of teaching practical
biblical principles; and 6. An invitation to the interested to meet for a personal
discussion.
Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 910 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
146 See notes 10, 21 & 37 supra.
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The Chess II decision resolved this claimed state interest by arguing
that a policy allowing worship does not establish religion, but only
neutrally accomodates religion.' 47 If the Chess II conclusion is justi-
fied,.the university is left with nothing on its side of the balance.
Other courts, however, may not be convinced by the Chess I
court's reasoning.1 48  Thus, if there is basis for the university's
claimed interest, the students' interests will still outweigh the univer-
sity's. This result follows from the assumption that all first amend-
ment constitutional rights are coordinate; 49 no one of them is to be
subordinate to any other one. This principle presents the chief objec-
tion to the application of the balancing test to the campus cases.
When, however, one side to the controversy can legitimately assert
three separate constitutional rights vis-a-vis the other side's one, that
group of constitutional rights may appropriately be given primacy
over the single constitutional right. The students' rights of free
speech, freedom of association, and the free exercise of religion out-
weigh the university's interest in non-establishment. For that reason,
student religious groups should be allowed to worship in their cam-
pus buildings.' 50
Jonathan W. Anderson
147 635 F.2d 1310, 1317.
148 The lower court opinions in the campus cases did not find a neutral accommodation.
See text accompanying note 22 supra.
149 See text accompanying notes 90 to 100 supra.
150 The United States Supreme Court has recently decided the Chess case, supra note 4.
Widmar v. Vincent, 50 U.S.L.W. 4062 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1981). The Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals decision for the student religious group. Basing its decision on the students' speech
and association rights, the Court held that the University's exclusionary policy violated the
fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral. 50
U.S.L.W. at 4066. The Court found the University's alleged justification for its violation-
maintaining strict separation of church and state--insufficient to justify the exclusionary pol-
icy. The Court reasoned that the University's "equal access" policy did not conflict with the
establishment clause. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4064.
As for the students' free exercise rights, the Court expressly avoided inquiring into "the
extent, if any, to which Free Exercise interests are infringed by the challenged University
regulation." In addition, the Court explicitly avoided reaching "the questions that would
arise if state accomodation of Free Exercise and Free Speech rights should, in a particular
case, conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause." 50 U.S.L.W. at 4065 n. 13.
Thus, the Court has left unresolved the question of how to settle a direct conflict between free
exercise and nonestablishment. For a discussion of this question, see text accompanying notes
91-96 supra.
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